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The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The 
First Hundred Years, 1789-1888. By David 
P. Currie. (Chicago: The University of Chi-
cago Press, 1986. 504 pp. Indexed. $55.00.) 
In the introduction to this book, Professor 
Currie succinctly states his intention: "My 
aim is to provide a critical history, analyzing 
from a lawyer's standpoint the entire consti-
tutional work of the Court's first hundred 
years. My search is for methods of constitu-
tional analysis, for techniques of opinion 
writing, for the quality of the performances of 
the Court and of its members." 
It is a formidable challenge to read every 
Supreme Court decision involving constitu-
tional issues between 1789 and 1888. It is an 
impressive intellectual accomplishment to an-
alyze the performance of every justice who 
wrote an opinion in those cases. To analyze 
critically over one hundred and forty cases 
with clarity and convincing logic while sum-
marizing all the remaining constitutional de-
cisions of the period in the notes is extraordi-
nary. To do this in 452 pages of text, excluding 
appendices and indexes, is a minor miracle. 
Yet that is just what Professor Currie has 
done. 
In order to accomplish this remarkable feat, 
Currie had to keep his focus narrow. Every 
justice who sat on the court between 1789 and 
1888 is critiqued individually, but the judges 
are reduced to their opinions. Those opinions 
are analyzed in terms of legal craftsmanship 
rather than placed in the context of the his-
tory of their time. The political struggle be-
tween Jefferson and the Federalists that pro-
vides the background for Marbury v. Madison 
is buried in the notes. Currie does not even 
mention the financial shenanigans of the of-
ficers of the Second Bank of the United States 
in Baltimore that gave poignancy to the argu-
ments of Maryland in McCulloch v. Maryland 
that the bank was a private institution. He is 
not interested in discussing in this book why 
decisions turned out the way that they did, or 
even what effect those decisions had upon so-
ciety. His quest is for the technical compe-
tence of the opinions written to justifY the de-
cisions. 
The standards Currie applies are simple. 
"Since the Constitution is law, the judges have 
no right to ignore constitutional limitations 
with which they disagree .... Beyond this, I 
share the conventional views that judges have 
an obligation to explain the reasons for their 
decisions as concisely and persuasively as 
practicable and that they should strive for 
consistency, reserving the right to correct 
egregious and important errors on relatively 
rare occasions." Judged by these criteria, 
there are very few flawless constitutional 
opinions in the first century of the court's ex-
istence (or, for that matter, in its second cen-
tury). 
The book begins with the frequently over-
looked decisions of the court before John Mar-
shall became Chief Justice. That Court invali-
dated a state law, engaged in judicial review 
of federal legislation, established principles of 
construction of constitutional issues and 
fleshed out the jurisdictional framework of the 
federal court system. Currie uncovers the 
early pension cases cited by Marshall in Mar-
bury u. Madison, including decisions never 
published by the Court, and examines their 
impact on the role of the Court. 
After restoring the early work of the Court 
to its proper claim on otir attention, Currie 
discusses the decisions of the Court under 
John Marshall. Those decisions have been ex-
tremely influential in shaping our nation. 
Marshall gave federal powers a generous con-
struction, and the Court under Marshall acted 
vigorously in applying constitutional limits to 
the states. But while Currie gives Marshall's 
genius its due, he also takes Marshall to task 
for inconsistency, for ignoring opposing argu-
ments, and for overreaching. On the crucial 
issues for decision, Marshall tended to be too 
conclusory to suit Professor Currie. "In short, 
though Marshall has been generally admired, 
it is difficult to find a single Marshall opinion 
that puts together the relevant legal argu-
ments in a convincing way." 
Taney lacked Marshall's statesmanship and 
wrote a disastrous opinion in Dred Scott. N ev-
ertheless, Currie writes that Taney at his best 
was not only clear but also extremely persua-
sive. Taney's opinion in The Genesee Chief, ex-
tending the admiralty jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts beyond tidewaters to the Great 
Lakes, earns Currie's praise as an impressive 
achievement. But Taney had formidable intel-
lectual rivals on the court, notably Justices 
Story and Curtis. Currie praises Story for his 
dissent in The Charles River Bridge Case, al-
though most modern critics are more likely to 
agree with the majority in limiting the impact 
of the contract clause on contracts made by 
the state. Justice Curtis gathers laurels from 
Currie for statesmanship in interpreting the 
commerce clause, but only his dissent in Dred 
Scott receives unconditional praise. 
Justice Miller emerges as the star of the Su-
preme Court under both Chief Justices Chase 
and Waite. But praise for Miller's "exemplary 
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clarity and brevity" does not distract Currie 
from criticism of "a strong judge with unusu-
ally great abilities and little respect for the 
law." 
Currie does not take issue with the substan-
tive outcome of many of the court's decisions 
in the first hundred years. Even where he be-
lieves that an important decision distorted the 
Constitution, he states that most of the time 
the decision was fairly debatable. His funda-
mental critique is of craftsmanship and not of 
result. The criticism may be warranted, but it 
is surely only a partial view of the behavior of 
the Court. 
Currie's list of great justices is short: Mar-
shall, Story, Taney, Curtis and Miller. He also 
notes the shortcomings of even the chosen few, 
castigating the invalidation of the Missouri 
Compromise by Taney and others in Dred 
Scott u. Sandford as the worst decision ever 
written. Currie acknowledges that "from the 
smug advantage of a century or two of hind-
sight, it is easier to find fault than to write a 
good opinion; an attempt to rewrite Marbury 
v. Madison is sobering even today." He selects 
Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott as "the supreme 
monument of the lawyer's craft in the first 
century of constitutional adjudication." A 
closer look at that opinion, however, suggests 
that even Currie may not be critical enough. 
Curtis's conclusion that the citizenship of a 
free black depends on the status given free 
blacks by the state of the individual's birth, 
regardless of where the individual resides or 
where he achieved freedom is not thoroughly 
explained in the opinion. It produces weird 
anomalies-the free black residing in a state 
that regards free blacks as citizens would still 
not be a citizen of the United States or of that 
state if the state of his birth did not consider 
free blacks to be citizens. A national citizen-
ship based on birth and free status would 
seem to be a more plausible decision. 
The book is adapted from a series of articles 
in law reviews. It follows law review format 
with footnotes at the bottom of each page. 
Thus, some pages have only a few lines of text 
while the rest of the page is footnotes. The 
format, however, is wise. It enables the reader 
to follow the details of arguments in each case 
and later doctrinal developments without 
having to flip back and forth from one part of 
the book to another. 
In general, Currie gives a precise and accu-
rate rendition of the decisions of the court. 
However, there is at least one notable blooper. 
He castigates Chief Justice Chase for dis-
senting in Bradwell v. Illinois, noting that it 
was impossible to see why Chase had dis-
sented because Chase "had agreed with 
Slaughterhouses narrow interpretation of the 
only clause relied on." In fact, Justice Field, 
expounding a broad interpretation ofthe priv-
ileges and immunities clause, stated in The 
Slaughterhouse Cases that Chief Justice 
Chase concurred with his dissent. 
Such lapses by Currie are rare. This book 
discusses virtually every constitutional deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in its first century, 
giving a technical critique of all of the impor-
tant cases. The writing is clear. Given the 
scope of the project, it is a model of brevity. 
Judged by his own criteria of explaining the 
reasoning of decisions as concisely and persua-
sively as practicable, Currie has done a superb 
job. 
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